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Abstract
Following Elizabeth Anscombe, rights exist within practices. A right con-
sists in a bundle of possible and impossible moves within the relevant
social ’game’, e.g. the practice of private property. What becomes of basic
rights on such a social-constructivist conception?
Katharina Nieswandt “Life and Other Basic Rights in Anscombe”
Metaphysically, basic rights do not differ from other rights. The right
not to be murdered, however, enjoys a transcendental status within Ans-
combe’s moral philosophy, and this construction might extend to other
basic rights: Since practical reasoning is directed at the good life, there can
be no sound practical inference concluding in murder.
Anscombe’s argument for this presupposes a particular conception of
human dignity, which is quite similar to the dominant conception in con-
temporary human rights literature.
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1 Rights As Moves within Social Practices
On my reading, Elizabeth Anscombe holds the following view on rights:1
Claim 1 A right is a bundle of possible and impossible moves within
a social practice. Some of these are moves by the right-holder,
some are moves by others.
Claim 2 A social practice is a widely played game that serves a telos. To
some extent, this telos fixes the rules of the game. For many such
games, participation is not optional.
Let me flag that both claims constitute substantial interpretations. Ans-
combe nowhere explicitly offers an account of rights; these are a recurring
topic in several of her papers.2 The above is my attempt to combine her
scattered discussions into a coherent and plausible account. This metaethi-
cal account can be of interest even to readers who do not share Anscombe’s
views within normative ethics.
2 Practice-Internal Modality: Rules
It is easiest to explain the two above claims by means of an example. Imag-
ine, you had a visitor from a culture where private property is unknown,
and you had to explain to her what it means to say that the apples on the
tree in the next garden belong to your neighbor Adam. Your visitor desires
to pick these apples; it is easy to climb over the fence between your garden
and Adam’s, but nevertheless the visitor cannot pick these apples, and you
have to explain to her the meaning of this “cannot.”
This leads us to Claim 1 because you might say: “We cannot pick these
apples (prohibition) without asking Adam (permission).” Or: “If we eat them,
1For a detailed discussion, please see Katharina Nieswandt, “Anscombe on the
Sources of Normativity,” The Journal of Value Inquiry 51, no. 1 (2016).
2Most importantly: RRP, SAS and PJ.
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Adam could demand that we compensate him (command).” Or: “Adam
is the only one allowed to pick these (privilege).” What you would be
doing here is to give an extensional definition of the concept ’property
right’ (or of a certain kind of property right). You would provide a list
of statements about possible actions on your/your visitor’s part and on
Adam’s part. Anscombe calls these statements “stopping modals” if they
express prohibitions and “forcing modals” if they express commands.3
Stopping/forcing modals are usually formulated using modal auxiliary
verbs (“must,” “can’t,”...), but we can also use the adjectives “possible”
and “necessary.” (E.g., “It is not possible for you to pick these apples” or
“It is necessary for you not to pick these apples.”) Following Anscombe,
this extensional definition is the only definition one can give of a specific
right without already invoking the general concept ’right’.4 What it means
for Adam to own these apples just is that others cannot take these apples
and that others who do take these apples need to compensate Adam and
that he can pick these apples and etc.
This leads us to Claim 2 because the type of modality invoked here
needs explanation. In what sense is it necessary for the visitor not to pick
the apples; in what sense is it impossible for her to pick them? As Anscombe
points out “in such a case [where] you are told you ‘can’t’ do something
you plainly can, as comes out in the fact that you sometimes do.”5
If you believe that the prohibitions, commands, privileges etc. around
Adam’s apples are justified, then you regard this case as one of moral
modality. If your modal statements only refer to the social fact that the
respective behaviors are officially forbidden, required etc. in your society,
then you regard it as legal modality. Both, moral and legal modality, fall
3One could think that a third category were necessary to express privileges, “permit-
ting modals.” As Roger Teichmann (The Philosophy of Elizabeth Anscombe (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2008), 97) points out, however, privileges can be defined through
negated stopping modals, such as: “It is not the case that Adam mustn’t pick these ap-
ples.”
4See her rendering of “Hume’s Circle,” RRP, 99–101.
5RRP, 101.
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into a category that we could name “normative modalities.” Anscombe
provides the following illustration: “If I say ‘You can’t wear that!’ and
it’s not, for example, that you are too fat to get it on, that’s what I call a
stopping modal.”6 It is physically possible for you to put on these clothes.
What makes it impossible is that these clothes violate some norm. It might
be a norm of beauty (aesthetic modality). It might also be respect: While
you do look fantastic in these clothes, they would be inappropriate for the
funeral to which you are going. Other examples of normative modalities
are grammatical modality and mathematical modality.
Normative modality blocks actions in that it makes them incorrect.
Physical modality, on the other hand, blocks actions in that it makes them
practically impossible. Your visitor cannot pick the apples on the top branches
because these are out of reach, and she cannot pick more than five apples
in ten seconds if picking one apple takes at least two seconds.
It is at this point of the explanation that we need the concept ’practice’.
For the action to be incorrect means for it to violate some norm. What pro-
vides the norm? What endows it with force? Immanuel Kant, e.g., would
say that it is a norm of practical reasoning: Your visitor cannot want to
pick the apple without violating the norm of consistency for her actions.
Anscombe offers a different solution. For her, such a norm is some rule
of a widely played game—in this case the property game. Your visitor is
physically able to pick the lower-hanging apples but that would be theft;
i.e., it would violate the norms either of morality or the local law or both.
In sum, for Anscombe to say that someone has a right is to say that
certain actions are (in)correct within a corresponding practice.
3 Practice-Grounding Modality: Goods
I defined a social practice as a widely played game that serves a telos.
(Note that this definition is much narrower than many current uses.) We
6RRP, 101.
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already discussed the example of private property; some other examples
are: contractual affairs (such as promising or marriage), elections or money.
Here is not the place for a comprehensive discussion of what a social
practice is. I only intend to highlight three features of practices that are
relevant to our topic. The telos of the practice often makes it necessary ...
1. ... to have either this or a similar practice.
2. ... for the practice to (not) have certain rules.
3. ... that every member of the relevant group participate in the practice.
It is necessary to have some practice of private property (if it is), e.g., be-
cause without it “some good will not be attained or some evil avoided.”7
Philippa Foot defends a similar view when she calls the practice of promis-
ing an “Aristotelian necessity.”8 A prominent historical defender of this
kind of view on property is David Hume, who regards this practice (which
he calls a “convention”) as a precondition for human beings to live to-
gether in larger, more anonymous groups, in other words, to leave the
state of nature:
[T]he principal disturbance in society arises from those goods,
which we call external, and from their looseness and easy tran-
sition from one person to another; [in order to be able to live
together, human beings] [. . . ] must seek for a remedy [...]. This
can be done after no other manner, than by a convention en-
ter’d into by all the members of the society to bestow stability
on the possession of those external goods, and leave every one
in the peaceable enjoyment of what he may acquire by his for-
tune and industry. By this means, every one knows what he
7RRP, 100; citing Aristotle, Meta 1015a22–23.
8Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001): 15–17 and
43–46.
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may safely possess; and the passions are restrain’d in their par-
tial and contradictory motions. [...][I]t is by that means [that]
we maintain society [...].9
Various property practices are conceivable that could achieve this aim.
This leads us to the second feature of practices, viz. that the practice’s te-
los often makes it necessary for the practice to have certain rules but not
others. If, e.g., Hume should be correct in that the telos of the practice of
property is to create “stability of possessions” and to “restrain the pas-
sions,” and that this can be achieved only if everyone is left “in the peace-
able enjoyment of what he may acquire by his fortune and industry,” then
any actual property practice must be evaluated on the basis of whether
it fulfills these criteria. To give an example: If R, a rule for allocation in
property practice P, says that everyone gets to keep the proceeds of their
personal labor, then P could be expected to achieve its telos. If R says that
the proceeds are largely allocated to the owner of the means of production
or to whichever citizen wore the most colorful shirt the previous Tuesday,
then P cannot achieve its telos.
This ties in with the third above-listed feature, viz. that practices of-
ten require all group members to participate. This is certainly true of the
practice of private property. If individual group members could exclude
themselves, then the participants would not be secure in their belongings.
I began my explanation of the three features of practices with the as-
sumption that it is necessary for human beings to have a practice of prop-
erty. To what kind of modality am I referring here? It cannot be a practice-
internal necessity. I.e., it would not be against the rules of some further
practice not to have a practice of property. Therefore, not having this prac-
tice is not “incorrect”; it does not violate any rules.
According to Anscombe and Foot, the modality is that of realizing cer-
tain goods. If, e.g., it is good to live in larger social groups and, ultimately,
9David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University
Press, 2000), Sec. 3.2.2, §9.
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to form a state, and if Hume is right about the enabling role of property in
this, then it is necessary to have the practice of property in order to realize
the good of political community.
Following Geach,10 Anscombe understands “good” to mean either “good
as” or “good for.” I.e., it either is good as an individual of a certain kind.
To what does “good” refer here? Anscombe’s answer (as well as that of
Geach, Foot, Hursthouse and other neo-Aristotelians) is: It refers to the
good life for human beings (i.e., to human “well-being” or “flourishing”).
Applied to our example of property, philosophers have claimed both: It
is good as a human being to live in a political community. We are politi-
cal animals, so political community is a constitutive aspect of our species-
specific flourishing (as Plato and Aristotle claim). And it usually is good
for a human being to do so, due to the instrumental advantages of group
life (which Hume has in mind when he advocates property).
In sum, to say that a practice is necessary means to say that it is the
only way to achieve an important human good. Human nature determines
what things constitute important goods for human beings, and thereby it
sets the norm for adopting (or rejecting) practices.
4 The Justification of Rights versus Practices
What is the upshot of these general considerations about moves and prac-
tices for our topic of rights? Claim 1, that a right is a bundle of moves that
can be made or blocked within a practice, has important implications for
the justification of rights and hence for what rights exist.11
Anscombe applies Wittgenstein’s metaphysical perspective, according
to which we must think of normative demands in terms of games and
10Peter Geach, “Good and Evil,” Analysis 17, no. 2 (1956).
11For rights, justification and existence are tied together (Katharina Nieswandt, “Do
Rights Exist by Convention or by Nature?,” Topoi 35, no. 1 (2016)). If it is not justified, e.g.,
that governments preemptively monitor all citizens, then governments have no right to
do so; i.e., then a right of governments to preemptively monitor all citizens does not exist.
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rules, to the topic of rights. She therefore also draws a “distinction between
justifying a practice and justifying a particular action falling under it.”12
To use a stopping modal such as “You can’t take these apples!” is to make a
move within the property game, according to Anscombe. The justification
for this move will consist in an explication of the rules; the justification of
the property game as a whole is of no consideration at this point. It would
at best be superfluous, but often false to mention it. Let me illustrate this,
using our earlier example.13
If the visitor demanded a justification of your stopping modal “You
can’t take these apples,” then it would be correct if you replied “Because
these apples are Adam’s property.” What you would be doing here is to
supply the “logos” of the stopping modal, as Anscombe calls it. You men-
tion a fact that sounds like an independent reason: Because of the fact that
Adam owns these apples, a second fact obtains, viz. that you cannot take
them. A closer look reveals, however, that what you do here simply is to
provide the umbrella category for the second fact. The fact that the visitor
(just like you and like all people except Adam) cannot take these apples is
simply one element in the bundle of facts that together constitute Adam’s
ownership. You essentially say: “You cannot take these apples because
you cannot take these applesproperty right.” Or: “You cannot take these apples
because the rules of a certain practice forbid it and, f.y.i., that practice is
private property.”14
As Anscombe points out, this justification is vacuous or circular. (She
takes it to spell out “Hume’s Circle.”) For what you essentially say is “It
is impossible for you to take the apples, and the sense in which it is im-
possible is that it is incorrect, and what ’incorrect’ means is that it violates
the rules of some game.” In other words, you cannot take these apples be-
cause the rules forbid it. Nevertheless, Anscombe argues, it is the correct
12John Rawls, “Two Concepts of Rules,” Philosophical Review 64, no. 1 (1955): 3.
13For a detailed discussion, please see Katharina Nieswandt, “What Is Conventional-
ism about Moral Rights and Duties?,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97, no. 1 (2018).
14See Anscombe on “logoi,” esp. RRP, 101–102.
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and complete answer. It would be a category mistake to continue at this
point with a justification of the game. E.g., it would be false to say: “You
cannot takes these apples because the rules of the practice of private prop-
erty forbid it and because this practice is necessary in order to enable us
to live in larger groups and hence you should support this practice,” just
as you should support Oxfam. This is most obvious for leisure games: It
might be that the justification for playing poker is to win money, but the
justification for why you now put out the small bid is that you sit left of the
dealer—you would have to make this move even if it lost you money. You
cannot reject this duty under which the rules put you by saying: “But look,
one plays this game to win money, and this move will lose me money.”15
The justification of the practice is (usually) of no interest where a justifica-
tion for an individual move within the practice is demanded.
On my interpretation, Anscombe takes a social-constructivist position
on rights and a naturalist position on practices. Human nature necessitates
(if it does) that groups of human beings have some practice of property, e.g.,
and it sets the boundaries for which rules are acceptable. Once this practice
is in place, individual human beings can have property rights to individ-
ual objects, which simply means that certain moves within the practice
are open to them but are blocked for others (privilege) or that certain cor-
responding moves are required (command) or forbidden (prohibition) for
others.
5 Two Problems for Social Constructivism
For property rights, this hybrid of social constructivism and Aristotelian
naturalism is not implausible. Many readers who do not share Anscombe’s
philosophical leanings would still agree that property is a human inven-
tion, that it serves important social purposes, that different property prac-
tices are appropriate for different societies, and that human nature sets
15This example is modelled on one once suggested to me by Anselm Müller.
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some boundaries here. (If you personally believe that property rights are
natural rights, use another example, such as marriage or elections.)
For certain basic rights, however, Anscombe’s hybrid appears less ap-
pealing. What social practice is necessary, e.g., in order for me to have a
right not to be murdered? In fact, it is common in contemporary human
rights literature to define human rights as those rights that do not presup-
pose any social practices, i.e., as natural rights.16
Two problems arise for social constructivism about basic rights:
Metaphysical Problem There are rights for which there seems to be no cor-
responding practice.
Epistemic Problem That these rights exist seems more certain than most
things we could mention about a corresponding practice and
its justification.
An easy way to avoid these problems would be to sort the relevant moral
demands into another category than rights. Perhaps it is incorrect to un-
derstand murder as a rights violation? Anscombe, however, explicitly says
that there is a right not to be murdered: “[S]omeone who is murdered suf-
fers a great wrong. [...] If someone is wronged, he has a right which is
violated.”17 At the same time, she rejects the very idea of natural rights:
“A right is not a natural phenomenon [...]. It is in this respect like a rule
and a promise: that ’natural unintelligibility’ which Hume attributed to
promises is found in all three things.”18
On my reading, Anscombe avoids the above problems because the
good protected by the right to life (and perhaps by other rights) plays a
transcendental role in her metaethics.
16In an overview article, John Tasioulas calls this the “orthodox conception” of human
rights. (“Are Human Rights Essentially Triggers for Intervention?”, Philosophy Compass 4,
no. 6 (2009): 938.)
17MME, 266.
18SAS, 138; referring to Hume, Treatise, Sec. 3.2.1 and 3.2.5.
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Before we proceed, it is important to flag that Anscombe defines the
right to life very narrowly: “[T]here is not a simple right to life, but rather a
right not to be murdered.”19 This definition excludes a right to be brought
into existence (i.e., a deontic analogue of Parfit’s “repugnant conclusion”),20
and it excludes requirements such as that of abolishing all cars, given that
cars potentially kill people.
6 Basic Rights
For Anscombe, basic rights are not metaphysically different from other
rights. My summary of this will be brief because I have already developed
these ideas elsewhere.21 Take the following example by Anscombe: the
right of parents to tell their children what to do (on certain matters and
within certain boundaries) and to not be interfered with in this domain.
“[T]hose who have and carry out the task of bringing up children quite
generally perform a necessary task. It cannot be done without the chil-
dren’s obedience. So those people have a right to such obedience,” Anscombe
argues, and outsiders may not prevent them from imposing their deci-
sions.22 In examples like these, we have two kinds of necessity, a “crossing
of modals”:23
1. It is necessary that those who have the role of bringing up children
tell these children what to do. (Aristotelian necessity)
2. “If someone has a role or function which he ’must’ perform, or any-
thing that he ’has’ to do, then you ’cannot’ impede him.”24
19MME, 266.
20Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), Ch. 17.
21Nieswandt, “Do Rights Exist.”
22SAS, 145.
23SAS, 144.
24SAS, 144.
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3. Therefore, it is necessary for you not to impede those who have the
role of bringing up children when they tell these children what to do.
(obligation and corresponding right)
There is some good to be obtained or some evil to be averted here (#1), and
in conjunction with a version of the principle that ought-implies-can (#2),
we deduce the necessity to grant a certain right to some people (#3). Par-
ents, kindergarten teachers etc. perform this necessary task in our society;
hence they must be granted the privileges necessary to carry out the task.
One can always raise worries and further questions regarding any ar-
gument of this form, such as: Is the task really necessary? Are those tasked
with it the best to carry it out? “But in form it is sound enough, if I am
right about the relation between ’a right’ and certain modals,” Anscombe
concludes.25
This yields the following metaphysical picture: A good to be achieved,
such as the upbringing of children, can give rise to rights. This happens in
the following way: Human societies can adopt a practice that enables peo-
ple to realize this good. The shape of this practice can vary significantly
for different times and places, but any human society that is to realize the
relevant good needs some such practice. For the example of upbringing,
contemporary Western societies by default give the necessary privileges
to the biological parents and, to a lesser extent, educational professionals.
The boundaries of these privileges vary even among Western societies—
some allow home-schooling, e.g.; others demand that this part of a child’s
upbringing be carried out by professionals. Other societies had and have
very different arrangements. Different circumstances (such as the form of
the economy, the state of technology, the size of the population etc.) can
make different practices appropriate here; i.e., there is considerable room
for legitimate diversity. Still, we can objectively judge certain practices to
be outside the realm of what is legitimate or to be better than others be-
cause the telos to be achieved provides an external norm for their evalu-
25SAS, 145.
Postprint | September 21, 2020 Page 13 of 24
Katharina Nieswandt “Life and Other Basic Rights in Anscombe”
ation. We can also criticize societies for making it impossible for its mem-
bers to realize a certain good if these societies fail to adopt any practice
at all to further this good. Thus, one could think that material security in
old age is an important good and criticize societies that do not make any
provisions for the elderly, such as a pension system.
Anscombe’s view of basic rights can hence be summarized as follows:
Certain things are goods for human beings; some of these are basic goods.
Goods indirectly give rise to rights in that they make the adoption of cer-
tain practices necessary (and preclude that of others), and within these
practices, we assign rights. Some of these rights can be summarized un-
der the umbrella term “basic rights” or “human rights,” due to their close
connection with goods that are indispensable for human flourishing. But
their metaphysical structure is not different from less important and very
obviously conventional rights, such as my right to seat B-35 in the theater,
for which I purchased the ticket.
7 The Transcendental Role of the Good Life
Epistemically, however, the right to life differs from trivial rights—and
the same might be true of other basic rights. While “[t]he prohibition on
murder is indeed a great charter of right to all of us, it is the prohibition
that comes first and not the right,” Anscombe claims.26
Within Anscombe’s view of practical reasoning, an absolute prohibi-
tion must be understood as the exclusion of a sound practical inference.
There is no valid pattern of inference and set of true premises available
that would conclude in, e.g., the murder of an innocent person.27
Why think that an act of murder can never be the conclusion of a
sound practical inference? Anscombe endorses “the great Aristotelian par-
26MME, 266.
27This formulation was suggested to me by Ulf Hlobil.
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allel,”28 according to which the aim of practical reasoning is the good, just
as the aim of theoretical reasoning is the truth. “[E]very action and ratio-
nal choice, is thought to aim at some good,” ultimately that of “living well
and acting well.”29 Like Aristotle, Anscombe understands this good as the
good life (or: “well-being” or “flourishing”) of human individuals.30 To
forbid theft, e.g., perhaps even to define it, we need to tell a story like
Hume’s, Anscombe believes, which explains what good property rights
serve and which thus explains how the practice of property makes human
life better. Consider “the character of rational argument to shew that it is
wrong to steal, or commit adultery, or that we ought to keep a rule of the
road where there is traffic, or a close season for game or fish where stocks
must be replenished. The arguments are of the form ‘Obedience to this law
is needed for human good.’ The unit whose good the argument seeks is the
human individual, considered generally.”31 To murder someone is the ulti-
mate rejection of this good; it “is to destroy that being which is the point
of those [i.e., moral] considerations.”32 A right not to be murdered can be
assigned within various social practices—any justified system of law, e.g.,
would contain it. But it is our knowledge that there can be no sound prac-
tical inference concluding in murder which serves to justify the adoption
of such practices and hence of the relevant right, not vice versa.
Anscombe, I submit, makes a transcendental argument here: All prac-
tical reasoning is directed at the good life; therefore, it is in principle ex-
cluded that there could be practically rational (and hence justified) actions
28PI, 157.
29Aristotle, NE, 1094a1–2 and 1095a21–22 respectively, transl. by Roger Crisp (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
30Very importantly, the claim that the good life is the “aim” of practical reasoning does
not mean that every single action must ultimately be justified by appeal to the good life.
It would be false, e.g., to think that the reason why X must keep her promise to Y is the
amount of flourishing to be secured for Y or for their shared community. Practice-internal
actions, such as the keeping or breaking of a promise, are prime examples of actions that
must not be justified by appeal to human flourishing. (See Sec. 4 above.)
31MME, 266–267, emph. added.
32MME, 267.
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aimed at destroying this life. A necessary precondition for the possibility
of there being such a thing as practical rationality is that such rationality
aim at the good of the beings in question (us); so it can’t conform to prac-
tical rationality to destroy such beings.33 This is why “[t]he prohibition
[on murder] is so basic that it is difficult to answer the question as to why
murder is intrinsically wrongful.”34
The transcendental argument for the right to life that I reconstructed
in the previous paragraphs is modeled on a transcendental argument that
Anscombe explicitly makes—for the boundaries of the right of the state
to exercise violence. In her paper “On the Source of the Authority of the
State,” Anscombe argues that, as for the authority of parents, the source
of the state’s authority is a necessary task. In the case of the state, there
are two such tasks: protection from violence35 and, associated with that,
the “administration of justice.”36 A major claim in her paper is that it is
surprisingly difficult to define (and in practice to distinguish) between a
legitimate state and “a place that was rather smoothly run by the Mafia.”37
There is, however, “one consideration here which has something like the
position of absolute zero or the velocity of light in current physics. It can-
not possibly be an exercise of civic authority deliberately to kill or muti-
late innocent subjects. [...][Because] authority in the command of violence
(which was what we first saw as distinguishing government from a Mafia
in control of a place) is based on its performance of a task which is a gen-
eral human need. A way of treating someone which puts him outside the
class of those for whom the task is performed puts him outside the class
of those subject to the authority.”38 I.e., in the tradition of Augustine and
Aquinas,39 Anscombe argues that the privileges of the state—to exercise
33This formulation was suggested to me by Roger Teichmann.
34MME, 266.
35SAS, 135.
36SAS, 154.
37SAS, 133.
38SAS, 155, emph. added.
39For a modern rendering, see Jacques Maritain, The Rights of Man and Natural Law
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violence, to demand money of its citizens etc.—are justified by its task,
and, appealing to Hobbes,40 that the main task here is protection. This jus-
tification entails that the state loses its privileges if it refuses to fulfill the
tasks that ground them. (The same would apply to parents or teachers
who do not act for the good of the children they are bringing up.)
Anscombe calls this “consideration zero.”41 A state that murders inno-
cent citizens thereby annihilates its own authority. Regarding the right to
life, I submit, Anscombe makes a similar move. A system of ethics that
allows murder of the innocent annihilates that which has to serve as the
grounds of all practical reasoning, viz. the good life of the human individ-
ual.
There might be more actions for which this holds—consider torture
or rape. Murder, however, is the most fundamental and obvious exam-
ple of an action that can never be part of a good life (or of the exercise of
state authority). If we give up the aim of individual human flourishing,
Anscombe seems to think, then we give up the framework within which
our arguments take place; in other words, we give up our basis for evalu-
ating actions.
8 Alternative Conceptions of the Good
Not everyone would accept Anscombe’s claim that it can never be rational
to murder an innocent person. There are at least four alternative concep-
tions of the good at which practical reasoning is directed. First, one could
think that this good ...
Primitive Hedonism ... consists in maximal satisfaction of the agent’s egois-
tic desires.
(London: Centenary Press, 1944).
40SAS, 137; citing Leviathan: Ch. 17, §9.
41SAS, 145.
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On this conception, an agent only needs to consider her own individual
good life, not that of other people, and this good life is defined in a way
that is compatible with being a murderer: Satisfaction of my desires might
require that I murder my rich aunt, so murder could easily be rational.
Others think that the aim of practical reasoning is not the good life of
each individual at all but...
Consequentialism ... the best possible state of the world, which is deter-
mined as an aggregate of the goodness of the lives of individ-
uals.
Totalitarianism ... the good of a political community, which is metaphysi-
cally distinct from the aggregate of the goodness of the lives of
its members.
Nietzscheanism ... the good life of some superior individuals, whereas the
lives of all other individuals are of no consideration.
Let me elaborate on the example of consequentialism. Anscombe famously
accused consequentialists of showing “a corrupt mind,”42 given that (cer-
tain) consequentialists require the murder of the innocent if this saves a
greater number. I believe that she intended this accusation in the literal
sense of rumpere, ’(to) destroy’, ’(to) rupture’. The consequentialist tries to
prove certain actions as good through a move that gives up the very aim
of human action and hence the very standard by which their goodness is
measured.
Consequentialists, however, would likely reply that they simply hold
a different standard of the goodness of actions. Their criterion is the ag-
gregate of all individual lives, and that might require the sacrifice of some
individuals.
42MMP, 40.
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9 Anscombe’s Concept of Dignity
Anscombe does not think that the consequentialist aggregation is possible.
With Geach, she holds that “best (state of the) world” is not a well-defined
term.43 More importantly, however, she seems to believe that such aggre-
gation is incompatible with the idea of human dignity. “[T]o kill an inno-
cent person because it seems a good idea that he should die,”44 means “not
respecting in [t]his victim the dignity of a human being at all.”45 Her view
here has some overlap with Kant’s demand to always (also) treat others as
ends in themselves and with the standard accusation against consequen-
tialism that it ignores the separateness of persons. The very concept of
dignity or of a person, Anscombe seems to think, implies that we regard
that being’s flourishing as the source of legitimate demands on us, some
of which are absolute. Those who believe in human dignity would hence
have to reject any of the above four views.
In this last section, I want to show that Anscombe’s definition of “dig-
nity” is plausible and that, consequently, her transcendental view of the
right to life (which might extend to other basic rights) is plausible. Admit-
tedly, adherents of the above four views will not be moved by a successful
demonstration that their view is incompatible with human dignity. How-
ever, a lot of public discourse today shares Anscombe’s commitment that
grave violations of dignity are a non-negotiable reason to rule out actions.
Therefore, the justification that Anscombe provides for this commitment
can still be of interest to many readers.
Her view is quite similar to a widespread approach in the contempo-
rary human rights literature.46 Just as Aristotle holds that the good life
43Geach, “Good and Evil,” 41–42.
44MME, 266.
45DHB, 68.
46E.g., James Griffin’s On Human Rights (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press,
2008). Jeremy Waldron’s “Is Dignity the Foundation of Human Rights?” provides an
overview (in: Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights, eds. Rowan Cruft, Matthew Liao
and Renzo Massimo (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015)).
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grounds all “action and rational choice,” many contemporary political the-
orists hold that dignity grounds all human rights catalogues, such as the
UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (henceforth UDHR).47 There is
no universally accepted definition of “dignity,” but on most conceptions,
including the UN’s, respect for dignity entails a strong demand to consider
the well-being (or: “good life”) of each human individual for their own
sake, independent of this person’s character, their social contributions, so-
cial status, wealth or similar considerations.
To give an example: One of the rights prescribed in the UDHR is that
to education. “Education shall be directed to the full development of the
human personality”; it “shall be free” and “be equally accessible to all on
the basis of merit.”48 This right makes sense if our target is a good life
(or at least an equal chance at a good life) for each and every single indi-
vidual. If our target were maximal economic growth, then it could make
more sense to adopt a caste system instead, where some carry out me-
nial tasks and receive no education because all educational resources are
shifted to the brightest in each generation. Adopting an educational caste
system, however, is out of the question for any serious supporter of the
UDHR. Why? Because it would seriously neglect the lives of those who
were sorted into the lower caste, and concern for each and every individ-
ual’s good life was part of what it meant to respect their dignity and hence
was the justification for the whole declaration in the first place. The good
life of the individual is the reason why education “shall be directed to the
47General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 217 (III) A. (Paris, 1948).
Anscombe would probably have worried about the fact that the addressee of “shall”
here and in the formulation of all other demands which the declaration puts forth is left
vague. (The declaration’s preamble characterizes the list to follow as “as a common stan-
dard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and
every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teach-
ing and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive
measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition
and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the
peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.”)
48UDHR, Art. 26.
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full development of the human personality.” We would need to substitute
this declaration for an entirely different justificatory framework—a Uni-
versal Declaration of Economic Growth—in order to make a case for the caste
system.
Similarly, Anscombe must think that we need an entirely different sys-
tem of ethics than the ones within which most people currently argue in
order to coherently claim that, for instance, murdering one innocent per-
son to save multiple others is rational. We would need a framework that
does not contain the demand to consider each individual’s good life for
their own sake. This effectively means that we need a framework that does
not draw on dignity, given that, on the common understanding, consider-
ation of the individual’s good life forms an essential part of what it means
to respect their dignity.
Anscombe clarifies her conception of dignity only in broad outline. She
seems to hold that membership in the human species bestows dignity. She
explicitly opposes conceptions such as Peter Singer’s,49 which make rights
conditional upon actualized abilities and hence deny basic rights to in-
fants, to the severely impaired etc.
It is a mere trick to draw on the weight that this word “person”
has [...] if you then go on to explain the word so that it is rather
like the word “magnet.” A piece of iron gets magnetised and so
becomes a magnet; later it may get demagnetised and stops being
a magnet though it is still the same piece of iron. If indeed you
explain the word “person” as meaning someone, e.g., who can
talk (has self-consciousness) and lead a social life (have inter-
personal relations) you may say that someone can be the same
human being but no longer a person.50
As Singer’s proposal shows, it is possible to define “dignity” without the
49 “All Animals Are Equal,” in Animal Rights and Human Obligations, eds. Tom Regan
and Peter Singer (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989).
50MME, 268.
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element of unconditional consideration for each individual’s good life: It
could be that only the good life of beings who display certain abilities
needs consideration. Kantians offer still another alternative; they define
“dignity” through the concept of consistency: Since I value valuing in my
own person, Christine Korsgaard argues, I must value it in all other per-
sons.51
Anscombe’s conception of dignity, however, as centrally comprising
concern for a good life for each individual, is well-aligned with common
conceptions of dignity, such as the conception behind the UDHR. If you
subscribe to this kind of conception, then you must accept her claim that
murdering an innocent person can never be justified.
10 Summary and Evaluation
Anscombe’s metaphysical position on rights is that rights consist in al-
lowed and forbidden moves within a social practice. There can be no right
outside of a practice just as there can be no move outside of a game.
The right to life—understood as a right not to be murdered—is not
metaphysically different. But there is an epistemic difference: To question
this right is to question the point of moral deliberations. The good life
of the individual is that at which practical thought is ultimately directed,
Anscombe holds, just as theoretical thought is directed at the truth. To give
up this orientation hence means to give up practical reasoning.
Anscombe’s construction might imply that the same holds for other
basic rights, such as the right not to be tortured or the right not be raped.
She did not, however, develop her ideas on basic rights and on human
dignity in sufficient detail.
Anscombe regularly draws on the concept ’dignity’ when she discusses
the right to life. Her view of basic rights has structural similarities with the
51See particularly her Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity (Oxford; New
York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
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currently dominant paradigm of human rights, where the dignity of the
human individual is the grounding telos, too. To question whether every-
one’s dignity must always be respected is to question this human rights
framework (and perhaps the very idea of human rights). The definition of
dignity implied in, e.g., the UN Declaration of Human Rights, centrally in-
cludes that which Anscombe understands by respect for dignity: concern
for the good life of each human individual.
Katharina Nieswandt
Concordia University, Montréal
Department of Philosophy
katharina.nieswandt@concordia.ca
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